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Trust and Management: Explaining Cross-
National Differences in Work Autonomy 
 
Abstract 
We open the black box of what goes on in firms in terms of management of their operations. 
Work autonomy is a key aspect of firm organization and we test the hypothesis that societal trust 
affects the level of autonomy that firms grant to their employees. Analysis of up to 189,213 
individuals from 30 countries shows that trust is indeed highly conducive to work autonomy. 
This result is robust to controlling for a wide range of other features of countries’ institutional 
environment, including measures of labor regulations and institutional quality. Our findings 






In their effort to understand economic development, economists are increasingly digging 
beyond macro-level data on per-capita output, considering industry and plant-level variation in 
productivity (Syverson, 2011). Detailed analyses reveal wide and persistent dispersion in 
productivity levels among firms. To understand these differences, we have to open the black box 
of what goes on in firms that makes some firms so much more successful than others. 
Management practices are an important part of the answer (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007), but 
only to the extent that they offer a new black box concerning the factors that drive firm 
heterogeneity in management practices (Van Reenen, 2011). 
For some time, researchers have realized that trust matters for organizations, for instance, 
allowing firms to increase in size while maintaining levels of intra-firm cooperation (La Porta et 
al., 1997). Similarly, Bloom et al. (2012) empirically demonstrate that so-called bilateral trust, 
meaning trust between two countries, affects the extent to which multinational companies from a 
particular home country decentralize and give decision power to local managers in a particular 
host country. More generally, trust is linked to reduced uncertainty and transaction costs, which 
increases the extent of the market (Fukuyama, 1995). Many studies subsequently show the 
benefits of societal trust for economic development (e.g., Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Knack and 
Keefer, 1997; see Algan and Cahuc, 2013 for a survey). 
We link societal trust to work autonomy, which is defined as “the condition or quality of 
being self-governing or free from excessive external control” (Jermier and Michaels, 2001: 
1006). Work autonomy is associated with advantages and disadvantages for firms. Following 
past thinking on the division of labor (e.g., Becker and Murphy 1992), a key advantage of work 
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autonomy is that it increases employees’ productivity as it sustains more specialization in the 
production process. At the same time, work autonomy is associated with certain disadvantages, 
as reflected in the standard principal-agent problem. If workers have complete autonomy, there 
are no formal governance mechanisms preventing them from pursuing their own interests at the 
expense of the firm’s. Trust, however, mitigates the principal-agent problem. Monitoring and 
control are simply less urgent when two parties can trust each other, i.e., when the principal can 
rely on the agent to act in the best interest of the principal without any explicit incentive to do so. 
Hence, below we test the following hypothesis: the higher societal trust is, the higher the level of 
work autonomy that employers grant to their employees. 
 
2. Empirical analysis 
 
2.1. Data 
Measures of work autonomy are typically subjective, asking people to rate their level of 
autonomy at work. We use data from the well-known European Social Survey (ESS), Wave 1-5 
(2002-2004-2006-2008-2010) (http://www.europeansocialsurvey.org). The specific item that we 
use asks respondents to say how much the management at their work allows/allowed them to 
decide how their own daily work is organized with answers ranging from 0, “I have/had no 
influence” to 10, “I have/had complete control.” Extensive checks show that the measure thus 
obtained is valid, correlating with external factors in the precise manner expected. Autonomy 
increases with skill level and managers have more autonomy than subordinates do, for instance 
(Table 1). To be sure, our interest is in societal trust and the level of work autonomy of 
individuals in general. We thus do not study the trust level of a specific principal and how this 
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affects the autonomy granted to a specific agent, although this can be a question for future 
research. 
 
<< Insert Table 1 about here >> 
 
We measure trust as aggregated responses to the classic item: “Generally speaking, 
would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people?” Answers can range from 0, “You can’t be too careful” to 10, “Most people can be 
trusted.” Country scores are aggregated across all five waves to fit the idea that trust is a stable 
cultural trait with deep, historical roots (e.g., Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).1 Data cover up to 
189,213 individuals from 30 countries. Although all the countries in the sample have European 
roots, the sample is actually highly culturally diverse, covering the majority of cultural clusters 
recognized in the literature.2 Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sample as a whole. 
Table 3 presents detailed country scores for the most important variables. 
                                                 
1
 Ljunge (2012) uses ESS trust data, among others, to study the cultural transmission of 
civicness, finding significant intergenerational transmission of civicness. 
2
 For instance, the 30 countries in my sample belong to six out of the 10 main cultural clusters 
identified by the GLOBE project (House et al., 2004), the most comprehensive and up-to-date 
classification of national cultures currently available. To wit: (1) Nordic cluster: Denmark, 
Finland, and Sweden included; (2) Anglo cluster: UK and Ireland included; (3) Germanic cluster: 
Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands included; (4) Latin European cluster: France, Israel, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain included; (5) Eastern European cluster: Albania, Georgia, Greece, Hungary, 
Kazakhstan, Poland, Russia, and Slovenia included; (6) Middle Eastern cluster: Turkey included. 
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<< Insert Table 2 about here >> 
 
We use gender, age/age-squared, and education level as standard, individual-level control 
variables. Similarly, we include year/wave dummies to control for any idiosyncrasies in 
questionnaire design. The main concern is that our results are spurious, driven by unobserved 
country characteristics. We thus control for a wide range of country factors. Institutional quality 
may affect both trust and the level of work autonomy that firms are willing to grant to their 
employees. Therefore, we include measures of Rule of law and Control of corruption from the 
World Bank Worldwide Governance Indicators project. Similarly, we include the labor dismissal 
and labor regulations indexes developed by Botero et al. (2004) to control for formal institutions 
specifically aimed at governing the relationship between employers and employees. We further 
control for per-capita GDP, using data from the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
Finally, to consider the issue of causality we use a pure trust measure that is not co-determined 
by reigning socio-economic and institutional circumstances. Specifically, we use the inherited 
component of trust for the year 2000, as developed in Algan and Cahuc (2010). If data are not 
available, we drop the country from the analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                              
The four cultural clusters not covered by the sample are the African cluster (e.g., Namibia and 
Zambia), the Confucian cluster (e.g., China and Japan), the Southeast Asian cluster (e.g., India 
and the Philippines), and the Latin American cluster (e.g., Brazil and Mexico). The countries in 
the sample not covered by the GLOBE classification (9 in total) are: Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech Republic, Estonia, Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Ukraine. 
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Our analysis concerns respondents nested countries. We thus separate the variation at the 
two levels—between countries and within countries—and model them simultaneously, while 
taking into account the clustering of observations. The complete model reads as follows: 
 
( )jk0kjk1k0100jk euxβTγγA ++++= ,       (1) 
 
where jkA  denotes the level of work autonomy granted to individual j in country k, kT  is the 
level of trust, jkx  is a set of individual-level control variables (e.g., age), and kz  is a set of 
country-level control variables (e.g., GDP). 00γ  is the mean (intercept) that is fixed over all 
countries. There are two error terms, one at the individual ( jke ) and one at the country level 
( 0ku ). The model is a mixed model (McCulloch and Searle, 2001) that combines random and 
fixed effects. Specifically, the country-level error term means that the intercept is allowed to vary 
across countries, which is a way to incorporate country fixed effects. Values for the country-
specific intercepts can be obtained as posterior estimates. The method is Bayesian, applying 
shrinkage to draw outliers towards the sample distribution and allowing us to make inferences 
about the entire population of countries rather than just the sample. We estimate the model using 




Table 4 presents the results, which confirm our hypothesis. Trust correlates strongly, 
positively and statistically highly significantly with work autonomy (Model 1). The effect of 
trust on work autonomy continues to hold when we include the standard set of individual-level 
controls (see above) and year fixed effects (Model 2).3 A coefficient of 0.748 means that moving 
workers from Turkey (trust=2.60) to Denmark (trust=6.90) would increase their autonomy by 3.2 
points on the 0-10 scale, ceteris paribus. 
 
<< Insert Table 4 about here >> 
 
Adding a variety of country-level control variables also does not change our results, 
although the coefficient for trust is typically somewhat lower than before (Models 3-6). In fact, 
institutions nearly always have a statistically insignificant effect on work autonomy, while the 
sign may reverse across different model specifications. Finally, results using inherited trust 
affirm the causal effect of trust on work autonomy (Models 7 and 8). A coefficient of ±11 means 
that moving workers from Russia (inherited trust=-.121) to Finland (inherited trust=.114) would 
increase their autonomy by 2.6 points on the 0-10 scale, ceteris paribus. 
 
3. Discussion and conclusion 
 
                                                 
3
 Models that have the same number of observations are nested, allowing us to use likelihood-
ratio tests to assess the statistical significance of changes to model specifications. 
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We have sought to open the black box of how firms manage their operations, showing 
that trust fosters the level of autonomy that firms grant to their workers. Management practices 
are increasingly recognized for their vital implications, both for firms themselves but also for 
societies as a whole (e.g., Syverson, 2011; Van Reenen, 2011). Similarly, a growing literature is 
concerned with the economic consequences of informal institutions such as trust (e.g., Algan and 
Cahuc, 2010; Algan and Cahuc, 2013). Our note contributes to these two developing literatures, 
showing micro-level ramifications of trust that may go on to impact economies as a whole. 
Future research may provide a more direct assessment, using micro evidence on trust as a factor 
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Validity of the Work Autonomy Measure. 
Variable Mean work autonomy (0-10) 
Manager  
Yes [n=54,252] 7.74    (2.58) 
No [n=134,769] 5.14    (3.66) 
Education (ES-ISCED)  
I, less than lower secondary [n=12,117] 4.66    (3.89) 
II, lower secondary [n=21,160] 4.64    (3.81) 
IIIb, upper secondary, vocational or no access V1 
[n=29,535] 
5.38    (3.67) 
IIIa, upper secondary, general and/or access to V1 
[n=27,573] 
5.64    (3.55) 
IV, advanced vocational, sub-degree [n=14,330] 6.44    (3.37) 
V1, lower tertiary education, BA level [n=13,356] 7.28    (2.77) 
V2, higher tertiary education, >= MA level [n=14,819] 7.36    (2.77) 
Allowed to influence policy decisions about activities of 
organization (0-10) 
 
0 I have/had no influence [n=53,450] 3.10    (3.65) 
1 [n=14,423] 4.16    (3.16) 
2 [n=12,051] 5.23    (2.84) 
3 [n=9897] 5.78    (2.57) 
4 [n=7392] 6.08    (2.37) 
5 [n=14,877] 6.70    (2.28) 
6 [n=9228] 7.30    (1.87) 
7 [n=11,302] 7.82    (1.71) 
8 [n=11,835] 8.36    (1.52) 
9 [n=6475] 8.87    (1.35) 
10 I have/had complete control [n=19,867] 9.81    (0.99) 
Notes. Number of observations in square brackets. Standard deviations in parentheses. Data are 
own calculations based on data from the European Social Survey. ISCED stands for International 





 N Min. Max. Mean Std. dev. 
Dependent variable      
Work autonomy 189,213 0 10 5.89 3.58 
Independent variables      
Societal trust 189,213 2.60 6.90 4.94 .955 
Inherited trust in 2000 (relative to 
Sweden, originally 0-1-scale) (Algan 
and Cahuc, 2010) 
138,758 -.121 .114 -.010 .070 
Labor dismissal index (Botero et al., 
2004) 178,242 .143 .857 .499 .244 
Labor regulations index (Botero et 
al., 2004) 178,242 .282 .828 .598 .160 
Rule of law index (World Bank 
Worldwide Governance Indicators) 189,213 -.969 1.99 1.16 .783 
Control of corruption index (World 
Bank Worldwide Governance 
Indicators) 
189,213 -1.09 2.56 1.17 .959 
GDP per capita in 2000$ (/10,000) 
(World Bank World Development 
Indicators) 
189,213 .127 8.64 2.98 1.81 
Sex (1=male) 189,213 0 1 .479 .500 
Age (/10) 189,213 1.3 12.3 4.75 1.72 
Education (ES-ISCED)      
I, less than lower secondary 189,213 0 1 .064 .244 
II, lower secondary 189,213 0 1 .112 .315 
IIIb, upper secondary, 
vocational or no access V1 189,213 0 1 .155 .362 
IIIa, upper secondary, general 
and/or access to V1 189,213 0 1 .145 .352 
IV, advanced vocational, sub-
degree 189,213 0 1 .076 .264 
V1, lower tertiary education, 
BA level 189,213 0 1 .070 .256 
V2, higher tertiary education, 
>= MA level 189,213 0 1 .078 .268 
Not possible to harmonize 189,213 0 1 .298 .457 
No / missing information 189,213 0 1 .001 .038 












Inherited trust in 
2000 (relative to 
Sweden, 
originally 0-1-
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Austria 6.10 5.09 .052 .286 .501 1.88 2.07 33,774 
Belgium 6.44 4.95 .087 .143 .513 1.31 1.37 38,420 
Bulgaria 4.95 3.44  .143 .519 -.142 -.209 5599 
Croatia 4.27 4.38  .571 .488 .127 -.038 13,632 
Cyprus 5.97 4.22    1.16 1.14 26,708 
Czech Republic 4.32 4.39 -.098 .429 .520 .846 .328 13,974 
Denmark 7.37 6.90 .100 .286 .573 1.93 2.47 50,371 
Estonia 5.48 5.40    1.08 .907 11,931 
Finland 7.20 6.50 .114 .571 .737 1.95 2.42 40,678 
France 6.71 4.44 -.085 .857 .744 1.44 1.39 36,533 
Germany 6.20 4.71 -.049 .571 .702 1.66 1.80 36,766 
Greece 5.51 3.87  .286 .519 .764 .180 22,755 
Hungary 4.33 4.20 -.026 .286 .377 .859 .478 10,794 
Ireland 5.52 5.45 -.063 .286 .343 1.68 1.57 40,872 
Israel 5.99 5.06  .286 .289 .922 .857 24,036 
Italy 5.79 4.41 -.120 .429 .650 .612 .419 25,136 
Luxembourg 5.51 5.11    1.87 1.95 53,101 
Netherlands 6.54 5.82 .001 .714 .726 1.76 2.12 41,229 
Norway 7.30 6.67 .063 .714 .685 1.95 2.04 67,096 
Poland 5.09 3.98 -.089 .571 .640 .510 .280 9226 
Portugal 5.45 3.85 -.033 .714 .809 1.08 1.04 19,039 
Russia 4.49 3.98 -.121 .857 .828 -.901 -.998 8549 
Slovakia 4.45 4.08  .571 .657 .543 .333 13,644 
Slovenia 5.52 4.08  .714 .736 .946 .926 19,499 
Spain 5.95 4.98 .013 .714 .745 1.13 1.15 27,510 
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Inherited trust in 
2000 (relative to 
Sweden, 
originally 0-1-
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Sweden 7.53 6.21 0 .714 .740 1.89 2.24 43,533 
Turkey 5.30 2.60  .286 .403 .093 -.038 7316 
Ukraine 4.33 4.12  .857 .661 -.802 -.836 2326 


























Notes. See Table 2. Number of observations in square brackets. Note that averages for the sample pertain to country-level observations 
and are not weighted by the number of respondents in a country as in Table 1. For this reason, the means of Table 1 and this table 







Societal Trust as a Determinant of Work Autonomy. 
Dependent=Work 
autonomy (0-10) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 










(.130)   
Inherited trust       9.11*** (2.32) 
13.1*** 
(3.32) 






corruption   
.140 































No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of individuals 189,213 189,213 189,213 178,242 189,213 178,242 138,758 138,758 
No. of countries 30 30 30 27 30 27 19 19 
-2Loglikelihood 1,004,907.7 990,892.9 990,885.3 931,831.5 990,892.9 931,826.1 716,212.5 716,204.3 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses. Clustering at the country level is taken into account. All models include country fixed effects 
via random intercepts. *, **, and *** denotes statistical significance at the 5%, 1%, and 0.1% level (two-tailed). The labor dismissal 
and labor regulations indexes do not have time-series variation, but country scores on the other country-level control variables are 
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